We introduce a financial stress index developed by the Office of Financial Research (OFR FSI) and detail its purpose, construction, interpretation, and use in financial market monitoring. Using a logistic regression framework and dates of government intervention in the financial system as a proxy for stress events, we find that the OFR FSI performs well in identifying systemic financial stress. In addition, we find that the OFR FSI leads the Chicago Fed National Activity Index in a Granger causality analysis, suggesting that increases in financial stress help predict decreases in economic activity.
Introduction
The history of financial markets demonstrates that financial crises are often followed by large and persistent reductions in real economic activity. The 2007-09 global financial crisis was a devastating illustration of this. The crisis also made it clear that the modern financial system is global and highly interconnected, and that these interconnections can potentially act as conduits to propagate idiosyncratic shocks across the system in a contagion effect. Because of the potential for negative spillovers of financial stress events onto the real economy, accurately measuring financial stress is important to policymakers, who require clear and timely signals of market strains to develop appropriate policy responses to address these events.
Unlike other indicators in the economy, such as stock prices or the unemployment rate, financial stress is not directly observed and must instead be estimated. This paper introduces a financial stress index (FSI) developed by the Office of Financial Research (OFR). The OFR FSI is a daily, marketbased snapshot of systemic financial stress in global financial markets available to policymakers at the Financial Stability Oversight Council, its member agencies, the financial industry, Congress, and the public. The index distills information embedded in more than 30 indicators into a summary measure of systemic financial stress. It can be decomposed into five categories of indicators or three regions, allowing users to drill down into the drivers of financial stress.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 mandates the OFR to develop and maintain metrics and reporting systems for risks to financial stability. The law also gives the OFR the responsibility to monitor, investigate, and report on changes in systemwide risk levels and patterns. The OFR FSI complements other financial stability monitoring efforts at the OFR, particularly the Financial System Vulnerabilities Monitor, or FSVM. While the FSVM is intended to provide advanced warning of potential problems, the FSI measures the severity and 3 nature of stress as it occurs. Vulnerabilities can build during periods of low stress. For example, historically high asset valuations can be viewed as a financial stability vulnerability because they suggest that investors have complacent attitudes toward risk. During a time of high asset valuations, stress is likely to be low. However, a sudden and large decline in asset valuations can indicate stress resulting from a shock in investor preferences or risk appetite. Stress and vulnerabilities should therefore be separately measured.
The OFR FSI is distinguished from other FSIs 2 by its global scope, daily frequency, dynamic weighting scheme, transparent and methodical construction, and its ability to be decomposed into indicator categories and regions. Unlike some other FSIs, whose entire time series are re-estimated each time they are updated, the OFR FSI respects the arrow of time. The OFR FSI's value on a
given day depends only on information available that day and, once estimated, its value does not change. The OFR FSI's methodology accommodates input indicators of differing historical timespans. Importantly, as financial markets evolve, indicators that cease to reflect market participants' views about financial stress can be removed and more appropriate indicators added.
The value of the OFR FSI on a given date is proportional to the weighted average of the marginal contributions to financial stress of its constituent indicators. The marginal contribution of an individual indicator to financial stress is its signed standardized value (its value relative to its historical mean, divided by its standard deviation, and signed so that increases in the indicator correspond to increases in financial stress). The weights and the signs of indicators' stress contributions are determined using a dynamic factor model with a single latent factor, which essentially corresponds to the first principal component from a principal components analysis. The index is positive if the (weighted) average stress contribution of the indicators is positive. The index is zero if the average is zero, and is negative if the average is negative.
The OFR FSI is constructed in two steps. First, a set of indicators that reflect financial stress is assembled. We define financial stress to be disruptions in the typical functioning of financial markets. Symptoms of financial stress are informed by both theory and practice and include:
uncertainty about the fundamental value of financial assets or the behavior of investors; increased asymmetric information; and a decreased willingness to hold risky or illiquid assets (Hakkio and Keeton, 2009) . Indicators for the index must reflect one or more of these symptoms of stress in a timely manner. In addition, we seek broad and roughly balanced coverage across asset classes and global regions, including representation from U.S.-domiciled financial markets, markets from other advanced economies such as the eurozone and Japan, and emerging markets. The set of indicators is quantitatively screened, and redundant indicators are eliminated.
The second step in the construction of the OFR FSI on a given date is aggregating the set of indicators into a composite index. First, the component indicators are converted to a common unit by taking each indicator, subtracting its mean up until that date, and dividing by its standard deviation. The index is intended to capture systemic financial stress, which occurs when exogenous shocks or contagion effects occur in multiple markets simultaneously. We estimate this simultaneous co-movement using a dynamic factor model with a single latent factor that essentially corresponds to the first principal component. Unlike classical principal component techniques, however, the factor model accommodates indicators of differing historical time spans. This aspect of the methodology means that the set of indicators in the index can change in the future as the financial system evolves.
When the next date is estimated, the indicators are re-standardized, and the factor model is reestimated. As such, the OFR FSI's value depends only on information up until the date it is estimated. Unlike some other FSIs, the OFR FSI's past values are not re-estimated each time the model is estimated.
The first-order conditions from the procedure can be used to decompose the index into the marginal contributions of individual indicators to stress. These individual contributions are aggregated into sub-components reflecting the type of indicator. The indicator categories are credit spreads, equity valuation, funding, safe assets, and volatility. These indicator categories are useful in monitoring the drivers of stress. Similarly, the index can be decomposed by region into contributions from U.S. markets, other advanced economies, and emerging markets.
After detailing the construction of the index, we discuss examples of market monitoring using the OFR FSI. The use cases include the 2007-09 global financial crisis, the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, and the low volatility environment in 2017. The index and its decomposition into indicator categories and regions allows us to drill down into the drivers of systemic financial stress, cutting through the clutter of market chatter. Decomposition of the index shows which types of indicators are telegraphing market participants' views of stress. If indicator categories or region categories move together, we get some evidence of a broad based, systemic event.
A natural question is whether an FSI actually measures the latent indicator of financial stress. In Section 5, we discuss empirical properties of the OFR FSI. Using dates of significant government intervention in financial markets as a proxy for financial stress events, we use logistic regression to show that the OFR FSI identifies financial stress periods well and is fit to its purpose. We then consider the relationship between financial stress and economic activity. Using the Chicago Fed National Activity Index as a proxy for real economic activity, we use Granger non-causality analysis and conclude that high levels of financial stress help predict decreases in economic activity.
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This paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides background on financial stress and financial stress indexes, and distinguishes them from systemic risk indicators. Section 3 describes the construction and interpretation of the OFR FSI. Section 4 illustrates the use of the OFR FSI in OFR monitoring efforts. Section 5 describes empirical properties of the index. Section 6 concludes.
Systemic Financial Stress and Financial Stress Indexes
The global financial crisis of 2007-09 showed that stress events in the financial sector can have severe adverse consequences for real economic activity in terms of output, employment, and welfare. It also underscored the need for policymakers to have accurate and timely signals of financial stress to respond appropriately to mitigate the impact of financial stress events. Since the crisis, policymakers and researchers have become more keenly aware of and interested in systemic risk and financial stress.
Financial stress is an unobserved variable in the economy. Several attempts have been made to define and measure it (see Kliesen et al. (2012) and Hatzius et al. (2010) for surveys). Some researchers define financial stress as being directly related to financial market functioning (Carlson et al., 2012; Sandahl et al., 2011) . Others define stress indirectly as "systemic risk which has materialized" (Louzis and Vouldis, 2011) or as the product of the interactions between vulnerabilities in markets and shocks (Grimaldi 2010 (Grimaldi , 2011 . Although there has yet to be a consensus on what specifically constitutes financial stress or a financial stress event, there are common elements among these notions of stress, and this motivates the following definition:
financial stress refers to disruptions to the normal functioning of financial markets. The 7 definition is purposely broad, as financial stress can manifest in different ways, and no two stress events are exactly the same.
Although stress events differ in composition, there are several common economic characteristics of financial stress. Hakkio and Keeton (2009) survey the academic literature and summarize the symptoms of financial stress. According to their framework, financial stress is characterized by the coincident manifestation of one or more of the following:
• Increased uncertainty about the fundamental value of assets or the behavior of investors.
Volatility may rise when increased uncertainty causes investors to react more strongly to new information. Increased uncertainty can be measured by implied or realized volatility.
• Increased asymmetry of information.
Asymmetric information can worsen during a stress event if variation in true quality of borrowers or assets increases, or if information is deemed less reliable.
Information asymmetries can lead to problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, and to increased borrowing costs and decreased asset prices. Asymmetric information can be measured by increases in credit or funding spreads or decreases in risky asset valuations.
• Decreased willingness to hold risky assets.
Investors that change their preferences or risk appetite may demand more compensation for holding risky assets. This change may lead to price decreases of risky assets and price increases of safe assets. The change can be measured by decreases in risky asset valuations or increases in safe asset valuations.
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• Decreased willingness to hold illiquid assets.
Investors may become reluctant to hold illiquid assets if demand for liquidity increases in anticipation of unexpected needs for cash. This change may be due to rising volatility, or a perceived deterioration in asset liquidity. The change can be measured by increases in funding spreads.
These symptoms of financial stress are not directly observed in financial market indicators.
Instead, financial market indicators that reflect one or more of the above symptoms of stress are collected to monitor stress. A financial stress index is a univariate time series that aggregates the information in these indicators and isolates and measures the level of financial stress. to Kliesen et al. (2012) and Hatzius et al. (2010) for more detailed surveys of various FSIs and FCIs.
One of the first FSIs was developed by Illing and Liu (2006) (Rosenberg, 2009) , which is based on simple arithmetic averaging, and Hatzius et al. (2010) and the Chicago Fed National FCI (Brave and Butters, 2011) , which both use a dynamic factor model methodology.
Generally, FSIs and FCIs have been constructed in two broad steps. First, a set of observable financial market indicators that reflect stress is assembled. For FSIs, the indicators are nearly universally market-determined prices, reflecting the assumption that markets are the best and quickest aggregators of available information. (Kliesen and Smith, 2010; Hakkio and Keeton, 2009) or dynamic factor models (Hatzius et al., 2010; Brave and Butters, 2011) . Some authors take other approaches, such as methods inspired by portfolio theory (Hollo et al., 2012) or logistic regression models based on a pre-defined stress event indicator (Nelson and Perli, 2007; Carlson et al., 2014) .
The post-crisis environment has also been fertile ground for development of systemic risk indicators, or SRIs. SRIs measure vulnerabilities rather than stress. Examples of these include the conditional value at risk (CoVaR) (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016) , the distressed insurance premium (DIP) (Huang et al., 2012) , and the systemic expected shortfall (SES) (Acharya et al., 2017) .
Like financial stress, systemic risk has no universally accepted definition. Given that the financial system is large, complex, and constantly evolving, a diverse set of approaches and measures is needed to study systemic risk. SRIs such as CoVaR, DIP, SES, and most of the others outlined in the first OFR working paper (Bisias et al., 2012) , tend to be institution-specific estimates of the effects of low-probability but consequential, or "tail," market events. Bisias et al. (2012) 
Construction and Interpretation of the OFR FSI
The OFR FSI aims to provide a real-time summary measure of the level of financial stress by aggregating the information embedded in a number of market indicators related to stress. Here we detail the indicators included in the index and how we combine them.
Indicator Selection
The OFR FSI has a transparent and methodical construction. The construction has two steps: indicator selection and indicator aggregation. Indicator selection begins with a survey of the literature and financial market landscape for indicators that reflect one or more of the symptoms of financial stress outlined in the previous section of this paper. After considering the symptoms of stress, we created five distinct indicator categories: credit, equity valuation, funding, safe assets, and volatility. Definitions of these categories appear in Table 3A . While the OFR has a statutory mandate to monitor U.S. financial stability, it is important to recognize that stress from foreign markets can migrate to U.S. domestic markets. Accordingly, we consider three regions for classifying indicators: U.S.-centric, other advanced economies (such as the eurozone and Japan), and emerging markets. We require our set of indicators to have broad coverage across major asset classes, the five indicator categories, and the three regions. Moreover, we require each indicator to be -or be directly related to -a market-determined price. 
Credit
Contains measures of credit spreads, which represent the difference in borrowing costs for firms of different creditworthiness. In times of stress, credit spreads may widen when default risk increases or credit market functioning is disrupted. Wider spreads may indicate that investors are less willing to hold debt, increasing costs for borrowers to get funding.
Equity Valuation
Contains stock valuations from several stock market indexes, which reflect investor confidence and risk appetite. In times of stress, stock values may fall if investors become less willing to hold risky assets.
Funding
Contains measures related to how easily financial institutions can fund their activities. In times of stress, funding markets can freeze if participants perceive greater counterparty credit risk or liquidity risk.
Safe Assets
Contains valuation measures of assets that are considered stores of value or have stable and predictable cash flows. In times of stress, higher valuations of safe assets may indicate that investors are migrating from risky or illiquid assets into safer holdings.
Volatility
Contains measures of implied and realized volatility from equity, credit, currency, and commodity markets. In times of stress, rising uncertainty about asset values or investor behavior can lead to higher volatility.
Source: OFR analysis
Finally, we combine the qualitative factors with a quantitative test for redundant information. Taking advantage of the fact that the recent history in financial markets contains both a crisis period and periods of tranquility, we use a rolling 500-day pairwise correlation analysis to determine if two indicators substantially produce the same information during both volatile and tranquil periods. If this correlation is consistently high (greater than 0.8 in magnitude) through both the crisis period and bull markets, we consider them to be producing the same information. Absent a compelling reason to keep such an indicator in the index, such as for balance across indicator categories, we eliminate such an indicator from the set.
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Appendix A contains information about our resulting set of indicators, including source, time span of data, indicator category, region(s), transformation of the raw data before the aggregation step (to ensure approximate long-run stationarity), and basic summary statistics. All indicators in our set are available at a daily frequency, though this is not a strict requirement for inclusion because the indicator aggregation methodology (see next section) can accommodate indicators of different frequencies, such as weekly or monthly.
Indicator Aggregation
The 33 indicators used to construct the OFR FSI are chosen to reflect one or more symptoms of financial stress. We assume that financial stress manifests if and when the indicators move together. That is, the extent of the simultaneous co-movement in the indicators reflects systemic financial stress. This suggests that we use the first principal component from a principal components analysis.
We also want to account for relationships among indicators changing over time as the financial system evolves, which suggests a dynamic approach. The financial system may evolve to the point where certain indicators are no longer appropriate for measuring symptoms of financial stress and should be removed and possibly replaced. This is a particularly important aspect of the construction because as the financial system evolves, the set of indicators through which financial stress is manifest can change. For example, currently our set of indicators contains several measures related to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) in its funding indicator category. Because of attempted manipulation of LIBOR during the financial crisis and other problems, work is underway at the OFR and throughout the public and private sectors to develop a LIBOR replacement (ARRC, 14 2017). If such a replacement proves successful and funding market strains are reflected through the new indicator, we will substitute it for LIBOR in the index.
Indicator composition may also change in the future for other reasons. For example, the rise of China as an important financial market over the past decade or so may merit the addition of Chinese indicators that have a sufficient time series and data quality. We may in the future decide that other markets, such as real estate, are worth including in the index, provided we can achieve balance across regions. These and practical data availability considerations suggest the need to accommodate unbalanced panels in our analysis.
Finally, to be useful in real time, a stress measurement on a given date should be measurable with respect to known information on that date. Historical measurements of stress should not depend on information or events that occurred subsequently. All these factors motivate the following approach and estimation method.
We estimate the degree of simultaneous co-movement using a dynamic factor model with a single latent factor, a generalization of classical principal components analysis or PCA. The vector of weights on the indicators from the model shows the direction of highest co-movement or correlation in the data. The vector of weights can be viewed as the single best summary of the correlations in the data. Unlike other PCA-based FSIs, we estimate this weights vector each time the index is calculated, using information available through that date and not information from subsequent dates. Past values of the index are not recomputed. Finally, as in Hatzius et al. (2010) , the unbalanced structure of our panel dataset is accommodated by estimating the dynamic factor model using an iterative least squares technique rather than the classical singular value decomposition.
Suppose we want to calculate the OFR FSI on a given date . Let = ( ) denote the matrix of the data from the indicators in the index through date , transformed according to Appendix A, and standardized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. An indicator is eligible for inclusion on date if its historical time series goes back at least 500 trading days, which is approximately two years. We consider the following decomposition of the data:
where is the unobserved factor common across the indicators, is the unobserved loading of indicator on this factor, and is the residual variation in , which is assumed to be uncorrelated across the indicators. Note that , , , and all depend on the fixed time , but for ease of exposition we have dropped the reference to .
We want to estimate the vector = � : = 1, … , ( )� of indicator weights and the vector = ( : = 1, … , ) of the common factor. Solutions ( , ) of (1) are unique up to a constant, and so without loss of generality we impose the constraint that the vector has norm one and points in the direction most resembling the expected signs on the indicators (see Appendix A).
To estimate ( , ) we follow the approach in Hatzius et al. (2010) using least squares (see also Bai and Ng (2008) and Watson (2006, 2010) ). That is, �and � solve Minimize ∑ ( − * ) 2 over and ,
where we only sum over non-null observations of the indicators. This optimization problem is solved using iterative methods. given by classical principal components, i.e. by computing the eigenvectors of the sample correlation matrix.) The value of the OFR FSI on date is then given by ̂, the estimated factor evaluated at time . The decomposition of the OFR FSI into indicator-level contributions and indicator categories follows from the first order condition of (2), namely that
where � + is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of � , is the -th column of representing the time series of the -th indicator, and we have used our assumption that the norm of � is one. Thus, component of the largest subset of balanced panel data, taking the first principal component using a pseudocorrelation matrix constructed by the pairwise correlations using each pair's overlapping sample, and sampling from a random normal vector. We then select the iteration with the smallest sum of squared errors. 4 Descriptions of the indicator categories are in Table 3A . Additional information about the indicators in the index, including definitions of the abbreviations used in Table 3B , is available in Appendix A. suggesting that stress was broadly low across categories. The volatility category had the most negative contribution at -1.845, and each of the nine volatility indicators had negative contributions that were individually large for indicator-level data. This finding is consistent with the recent low volatility environment in equity, fixed income, currency, and commodity markets.
The Index and its Interpretation
The information in Table 3B facilitates another interpretation of the OFR FSI: the value of the OFR FSI on a given date is proportional to the weighted average of the standardized values of its constituent indicators. This can be easily seen by examining the Wgt. and Data* columns in Table   3B . The Wgt. column is simply the absolute value of the Coef. column, the column of indicator 20 weights from the dynamic factor model. The Data* column is just the standardized value of the indicator on that date, signed to reflect that increases in the indicator correspond to increases in financial stress. The value of the index is then the weighted average, using the weights in Wgt, of these signed standardized values in Data*. The index is positive if the (weighted) average standardized values of the indicators is positive, is zero if this average is zero, and is negative if the average is negative.
Additional interpretation of the OFR FSI can be gained by rewriting it on a given date as (see (3) 
Use of the OFR FSI in Market Monitoring
The OFR FSI is plotted from its inception in January 2000 through the end of August 2017
in Figure 4A . Several dates of interest are labeled. categories of the OFR FSI, particularly the volatility, credit, and funding categories. Figure 4D shows that the eurozone mainly drove the stress increase stress increase, though the U.S.
components of the index also contributed, either because of the S&P downgrade or a contagion effect.
Stress remained high for the next six months as credit ratings were downgraded throughout the eurozone and monetary authorities debated how to stem the crisis. The OFR FSI shows stress finally abated when Greece received a second bailout. But after trending lower for a few months, stress soared in May due to a Greek election and a large Spanish bank's request for a bailout. Stress declined for the balance of 2012 when Greece formed a new government, the European Central
Bank instituted a program promising more bailouts, and German courts allowed Germany's participation in a permanent bailout fund known as the European Stability Mechanism.
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Figure 4D: Decomposition of the OFR FSI during the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, By Region
Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P., Haver Analytics, OFR analysis
Recent Low Volatility Environment
The OFR FSI shows stress for much of 2017 has been trending downward to some of the lowest levels since the global financial crisis of 2007-09. As Figure 4E shows, current low stress is driven mostly by low volatility across global equity, fixed income, currency and commodity markets.
Stress contributions from all other categories of the index are negative, and funding and credit are also trending downward. 
Stress Identification and the Relationship of Stress to Economic Activity
Previous sections described how the OFR FSI measures systemic financial stress. In this section we aim to empirically test this. This task is challenging because financial stress is a latent indicator in the economy. Following Carlson et al. (2014) , we develop a proxy for global financial stress events using dates of significant government intervention. We show that higher values of the OFR FSI are associated with an increased likelihood of a financial stress event, evidence that the index measures financial stress. Next, we examine the relationship between financial stress and real economic activity. We find that higher values of the OFR FSI help predict decreased real economic activity, but not vice-versa. The analysis suggests that the OFR FSI performs well in identifying stress episodes, and that financial stress can have real economic effects.
Stress Identification Using the OFR FSI
The OFR FSI is designed to be a coincident indicator of stress in the global financial system.
A natural question is how well it fulfills its intended purpose. As financial stress is unobserved and subject to interpretation, one challenge in evaluating whether the OFR FSI identifies financial stress periods is the lack of a natural or obvious benchmark for comparison. Some researchers have identified financial stress periods based on opinion (Nelson and Perli, 2007; Illing and Liu, 2006) while others have identified systemic events as states of abnormal equity returns (Dattels et al., 2010; Arsov et al., 2013) . We adapt the approach in Carlson et al. (2014) that identifies U.S. financial stress as periods of "interventions by policymakers that occurred out of concern that troubles at a U.S. To test how well the OFR FSI identifies financial stress episodes, we run a logistic regression to assess the performance of the index in stress episodes defined by the intervention dates. The independent variable in the regression is the OFR FSI. The dependent variable, StressEvent, is a binary indicator with a daily frequency that is set at one in the four weeks before and after an intervention takes place, and otherwise set at zero. As in Carlson et al. (2014) , we consider stress episodes to extend from four weeks before an intervention date to four weeks after. This captures stress leading up to the intervention, and market reaction and policy implementation following the intervention. The qualitative results of the logistic regression are not sensitive to the choice of window. Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P., Bruegel, Carlson et al. (2014) , Haver Analytics, OFR analysis
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Descriptive statistics for the OFR FSI and the StressEvent are in Table 5A . Sources: Bloomberg Finance L.P., Bruegel, Carlson et al. (2014) , Haver Analytics, OFR analysis
The logistic regression results are in Table 5B . Standard errors for the estimated coefficients were computed using the moving block bootstrap method. We see from the table that the 31 coefficient on the OFR is positive and strongly statistically significant, with a p-value well below 0.0001. The area under the curve of the receiver operator characteristic is 0.76. The results suggest that higher levels of the OFR FSI are associated with being in periods of financial stress. In addition, the odds ratio of 1.31 suggests that the financial system is 1.31 times as likely to be in a stress episode for every one unit increase in the OFR FSI. The analysis confirms the usefulness of the OFR FSI as a coincident indicator of systemic financial stress.
The Relationship of Financial Stress to Real Economic Activity
We have argued that the OFR FSI measures financial stress, a latent indicator in the economy, and have provided statistical evidence that supports this. One of the motivations in measuring financial stress is that it can have adverse real economic effects. This can occur in several ways. In times of increased uncertainty, firms and households may delay or reduce hiring, investment, and spending. Investors may sell riskier investments and buy safer ones, contributing to market illiquidity and increased asymmetric information. All these actions can result in increased borrowing costs and tightened credit standards, leading to a reduction in spending and economic activity (Hakkio and Keeton, 2009 ).
Financial stress, as measured by other FSIs, can forecast declines in economic activity (see, among others, Kliesen et al. (2012) ). Having shown that the OFR FSI is fit for its intended purpose of measuring financial stress, we can empirically test whether increases in financial stress, as measured by the OFR FSI, leads to decreases in economic activity. As in Hakkio and Keeton (2009), we use the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) as a proxy for overall economic activity.
The monthly CFNAI is computed as a weighted average of 85 indicators of U.S. national economic activity drawn from four categories: production and income; employment, unemployment, and 32 hours worked; consumption and housing; and sales, orders, and inventories. The CFNAI tracks periods of economic expansion and contraction, and periods of changing inflationary pressure. The results from our analysis are in 
Conclusion
The OFR FSI is a daily, market-based snapshot of stress in global financial markets. It distills information from multiple indicator categories and regions, offering insight into the drivers of stress.
It helps the OFR monitor, compare, and understand financial stress events. The index offers improvements on other FSIs, including its decomposition into indicator categories and regions, and a dynamic construction that allows for changes in variable composition and cross-asset relationships.
Finally, empirical results suggest that the OFR FSI successfully identifies financial stress events and helps predict changes in overall economic activity. Key AE = Advanced economies ex-U.S., e.g. eurozone and Japan HY = High yield BaML = Bank of America Merrill Lynch IG = Inves tment grade CBOE = Chicago Board Options Exchange JPY = Japanese yen CEMBI = Corporate Emerging Markets Bond Index LIBOR = London Interbank Offered Rate EM = Emergi ng ma rkets MSCI = Morgan Stanley Capital International EMBI = Emerging Market Bond Index OAS = Option-adjus ted s pread EONIA = Euro OverNi ght Index Avera ge OIS = Overnight indexed s wap EUR = Euro P/B Ratio = Price-to-book ratio (value-weighted) EURIBOR = Euro InterBank Offered Rate USD = U.S. dollar L = level; DMA = difference of the indicator and its 250-trading day moving average; LRMA = logarithm of the ratio of the indicator to its 250-trading day moving average All variables are at a daily frequency, using values at market close.
7/21/2011
Euro area officials and European Union (EU) institutions decide on a new package of measures to end the crisis and prevent contagion, including: a new program for Greece, and an agreement that includes measures to enhance the flexibility of stabilization tolls by allowing the EFSF/ESM to act on the basis of a precautionary program, to intervene in secondary markets, and to finance the recapitalization of financial institutions through loans to governments, including non-program countries 8/4/2011
The ECB reactivates secondary market purchases and starts purchasing Italian and Spanish bonds in an attempt to ease market tensions 9/6/2011 The Swiss Central Bank announces its decision to cap the Swiss franc's euro exchange rate, in an attempt to halt its appreciation 10/27/2011
European leaders agree on another comprehensive package of additional measures, focused on Greece and European firewalls. Leaders also agree to "optimize" the resources of the EFSF by introducing two leverage options, allowing the EFSF's firepower to be multiplied 11/30/2011
The ECB, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, and the Swiss National Bank announce agreement to enhance their ability to provide liquidity. The agreement involves the extension of these arrangements to 
